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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-1576 
___________ 
 
CHRISTOPHER KENYATTA MOORE, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
REGINA M. COYNE, ESQUIRE; DANIEL PAUL ALVA, ESQUIRE;  
JEREMY EVAN ALVA, ESQUIRE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-18-cv-00299) 
District Judge: Honorable Jeffrey L. Schmehl 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 7, 2018 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR. and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 27, 2018) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Christopher Moore appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  For the following reasons, we will summarily 
affirm.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 In January 2018, Moore filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  
Moore alleged that three private attorneys “conspired” to deprive him of the opportunity 
to prove his innocence and raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a post-
conviction petition.  Specifically, Moore claimed that his trial attorney, Defendant Coyne, 
gave Defendant Jeremy Alva his criminal case file (including trial transcripts) based on 
Jeremy Alva’s false statement that he was representing Moore on his post-conviction 
petition.  Additionally, Moore alleged that Jeremy Alva is the son of Defendant Daniel 
Alva, who was representing Moore’s “adverse” co-defendant and orchestrated the plan to 
take Moore’s file.  Moore alleged that, as a result of the conspiracy, he was forced to file 
an inadequate post-conviction petition, which the state court dismissed as meritless.  The 
District Court dismissed Moore’s complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and denied him leave to amend.  The District 
Court explained that Moore could not state a constitutional claim against the defendants 
because they are not state actors for purposes of § 1983.  Moore timely appealed.   
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II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District 
Court’s sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is plenary.  See Allah v. 
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  When considering whether to dismiss a 
complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the District Court uses the 
same standard it employs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  When a complaint does not 
allege sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face[,]” dismissal 
is appropriate.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  “[W]e must accept as true 
the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
therefrom.”  Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996).     
 We agree with the District Court that Moore’s § 1983 complaint failed to state a 
claim for relief.  A § 1983 action may be maintained only against a defendant who acts 
under color of state law.  See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see also Kach v. 
Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining that to state a claim under § 1983, a 
plaintiff “must establish that []he was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory 
right by a state actor”).  Private actors, such as the non-governmental defendants named 
here, can be said to act under color of state law only if their conduct is fairly attributable 
to the state.  See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982).  We have held that 
private “[a]ttorneys performing their traditional functions will not be considered state 
actors solely on the basis of their position as officers of the court.”  Angelico v. Lehigh 
Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 277 (3d Cir. 1999).  The defendants in this case, private 
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attorneys, do not otherwise qualify as state actors.  See Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 
312, 325 (1981); Angelico, 184 F.3d at 277.  None of the conduct alleged in the 
complaint can be fairly attributed to the state for purposes of § 1983.  Thus, the District 
Court was correct in its conclusion that Moore’s complaint failed to state a claim for 
relief.  
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.1 
                                              
1 The District Court did not err in its decision to deny Moore leave to amend his 
complaint.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 112-13 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
